An Unsuccessful Urban Deep Excavation in Soft Soils by Rodgers, Richard & Majchrzak, Michael
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Scholars' Mine 
International Conference on Case Histories in 
Geotechnical Engineering 
(1993) - Third International Conference on Case 
Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
03 Jun 1993, 10:30 am - 12:30 pm 
An Unsuccessful Urban Deep Excavation in Soft Soils 
Richard Rodgers 
Treadwell and Rollo, Inc., Pleasanton, California 
Michael Majchrzak 
Kleinfelder, Inc., Pleasanton, California 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge 
 Part of the Geotechnical Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rodgers, Richard and Majchrzak, Michael, "An Unsuccessful Urban Deep Excavation in Soft Soils" (1993). 
International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering. 1. 
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icchge/3icchge/3icchge-session05/1 
This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering by an authorized 
administrator of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including 
reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please 
contact scholarsmine@mst.edu. 
- Proceedings: Third International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering, St. Louis, Missouri, 
.. June 1-4, 1993, Paper No. 5.15 
~-= 
An Unsuccessful Urban Deep Excavation in Soft Soils 
Richard Rodgers 
Associate Engineer with Treadwell and Rollo, Inc., Pleasanton, 
California 
Michael Majchrzak 
Senior Geotechnical Engineer with Kleinfelder, Inc., Pleasanton, 
California 
SYNOPSIS This case history p:esents, from a geotechnical engineer's viewpoint, yari~ms techn_ical, budge~, coordination, staffing ~d 
"hidden agenda" issues that contnbuted to poor performance of a shored deep excavation 10 soft so1Is. The anticipated and actual construction 
procedures are discussed and compared. In addition, approaches to stabilize significant movements of the shoring, and the. methodology 
needed to justify a satisfactory future performance of a pile foundation system that was speculated to be damaged are discussed. By 
highlighting these issues, it is hoped geotechnical enginee_rs will anticipate and better deal wi_th the issues un~er their influence, unders~d 
issues over which they may not have control, and appreciate the need for mutual understandmg and cooperation by members of the des1gn 
team. 
INTRODUCTION 
Design and construction of a deep excavation in soft soils within an 
urban setting is a very difficult task that requires the cooperation and 
understanding of geotechnical issues by the design team, contractor 
and owner. One deep excavation made in San Francisco in the late 
1980's resulted in significant movement of shoring, distress to 
adjacent streets, loss of usable building space, significant delay to the 
construction schedule, increased costs, suspicion of future 
performance of the foundation system, and, finally, litigation. This 
paper discusses this case history from a geotechnical engineer's 
viewpoint, highlighting the issues involved that may have contributed 
to the final unsatisfactory outcome. Many of these issues are 
generally not apparent to the geotechnical engmeer until it's too late, 










Poor initial design review; 
Poor communication between the geotechnical 
engineer and the owner/contractor concerning budgets, 
areas of responsibility and construction methods; 
Accelerated construction schedule; 
Errors in construction which took significant effort to 
correct; 
Inexperienced contractor, subcontractors, and owner; 
Unusual owner relationship between developer, design 
professional and contractor; 
Least cost approach to design; 
The use of "second tier" staff for supervision during 
night shift; and 
Difference between acceptable movements and failure . 
The above issues are in addition to the technical issues that may 
ave had an impact on the cause of the shoring movement, and the 
npact on the foundation system. These issues include: 
• 
• 
Slope stability of excavations in Bay Mud; 
The i!flpact of disturbance to the earth berm shoring 
retentlon system; 
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• Improper excavation techniques; 
• The impact of lateral soil movement on a pile 
foundation system; 
• Verification of the reliability of the foundation system; 
and 
• The problems with using a larger than normal follower 
to drive the piles. 
Both the non-technical and technical issues listed above are 
discussed in the following sections of this case history as either 
distinct issues or incorporated within the description of the actual 
construction procedures. 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The project consisted of the construction of a mixed used high-rise 
that includes retail and residential covering half of a large city block 
in the South of Market section of Downtown San Francisco. The 
structure includes a six-story base structure 220 by 275 feet in plan 
with an additional two levels of basement extending below grade. 
Two 19 story residential towers were constructed above the base. 
The base structure and towers are all of reinforced concrete 
construction, with interior and exterior columns carrying loads on the 
order of 3,000 and I, 100 kips, respectively. 
The area of San Francisco in which the project is located is land 
reclaimed from San Francisco Bay. In the late 1800's, the 
waterfront areas of San Francisco were diked off from the Bay by 
seawalls, and sand and rubble fill was placed landward of the walls 
to provide developable land. The fill was generally uncompacted 
and, consequently, remains loose even today. At the project site the 
fill varies from approximately 10 to 25 feet thick, and is underlain by 
about 60 to 80 feet of compressible marine clay known locally as Bay 
Mud. Bedrock consists of interbedded weak shale and hard 
sandstone found at depths ranging from about 90 to 120 feet below 
the ground surface. Groundwater at the site fluctuates with the tide, 
but is generally on the order of 10 feet below the ground surface. 
An idealized subsurface profile is shown on Figure 1. 
The excavation required to construct the two level basement was 
about 28 feet deep and extended below the fill at the site and into the 
Bay Mud. The groundwater level is approximately 18 feet above the 
base of the excavation. To support the large column loads, and resist 
the hydrostatic uplift due to the groundwater, the foundation for the 
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Figure 1 
Idealized Subsurface profile 
Idealized Subsurface Profile 
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development is a pile supported mat. The mat is two and one-half 
feet thick except at pile caps where it is typically five feet. Piles are 
12 and 14-inch square precast prestressed concrete ranging in length 
from about 70 to 110 feet. The total number of piles driven for the 
project was about 1100. Each pile was designed to be driven to 
bedrock and to support 130 tons of combined dead and live loads. 
ANTICIPATED CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES 
Construction of the basement required a deep shoring system. To 
reduce the amount of dewatering, the structural engineer suggested 
that a braced sheet pile shoring system be used. The system was 
designed by an experienced shonng designer, using lateral earth 
parameters presented in the original soils report for the project. 
Following the initial design of the system, the Clwner requested a 
redesign due to cost constraints. As a result, the lateral earth 
pressures were reviewed by the geotechnical engineer, and higher 
passive pressures were provided as a result of adding a friction angle 
to the cohesion properties of the Bay Mud. The redesign of the 
shoring system, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
savings, consisted of braced sheet piles, approximately 50 feet long, 
with two levels of internal braces (struts). The design and 
sequencing of the shoring installation was closely tied to the 
installation of the pile foundation. The sequencing consisted of: 
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1. Drive the sheet piles around the site perimeter; 
2. Excavate to a depth of 6 feet to install the upper waler for 
shoring system and install precast concrete piles to SUPI 
foundation loads; 
3. Following internal dewatering, excavate a 1 to 1 (horizot 
to vertical) sloped berm from the depth of 6 feet to 
bottom of the mat grade; 
4. Construct central portion of the mat covering approximat 
one-half of the center of the basement; 
5. Install the first row of internal braces; 
6. Excavate berm to approximately 10 feet above the bottom 
the mat grade and install the second row of braces; and 
7. Excavate remainder of berm to reach final grade. 
The excavation sequences are illustrated on Figure 2 below. 
Prior to installation of the sheet piles, the geotechnical engin1 
reviewed the shoring design in accordance with the City of S 
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Figure 2 
Bermed Excavation Construction Sequence 
Construction Sequence 
- Bermed Excavation 
Sheet Pile Wall 
Stage 1 - Excavation to 
Founding Level 
Stage 3 - Excavation of Upper Section of Berm 
& Installation of Lower Struts 
Stage 2- Construction· of Base 
Slab & Installation 
of Upper Struts 
Stage 4- Completion.of Excavation 
Francisco's requirements for the excavation permit application. The 
purpose of the review was to evaluate whether the soil parameters 
used in the design were in accordance with those recommended by 
the geotechnical engineer. The shoring review was performed by a 
staff engineer who, because of the firm's literal interpretation of the 
purpose of the review, did not extend his review beyond soil 
parameters. The inclination of the berm slope, the depth of the 
shoring to prevent heaving, and the construction stages were not 
checked for stability. The shoring designer indicated that movement 
of the shoring system would generally· be limited to about 2 inches, 
and that would be tolerable for the adjacent streets and underground 
utilities. 
The above outlined construction procedures required that the piles 
to support the building be driven at a grade approximately 22 feet 
above the design pile cut-off grade. Concerns were expressed by the 
geotechnical engineer that driving piles from this height above the 
design pile cut-off grade would: 1) require the use of a longer than 
normal follower that would make it difficult to evaluate final 
performance of the pile; and 2) increase the potential for pile 
damage. Pile damage was a concern because many of the piles were 
expected to extend above the design pile cut-off grade because of 
variations in the bearing strata, and damage to the piles may occur 
during the excavation stage to reach design subgrade. · ·The owner 
and contractor ignored the engineer's concern and elected to drive 
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the foundation piles from the grade initially indicated. In order to 
address the concern regarding the performance of the pile using the 
follower, during the indicator pile program (which aids in estimating 
production pile lengths), the piles were driven with the anticipated 
length of follower, and at two locations, extra long piles were driven 
next to piles driven with the follower in order to evaluate the 
difference in pile driving with and without the follower. It was 
found that the energy dissipation associated with the use of the 
follower was equivalent to about 8 blows per foot with a Delmag 
D36-23 diesel pile hammer. 
A concern was also raised by the geotechnical engineer regarding 
the method of excavation. The concern addressed the use of steep 
temporary construction slopes during excavation that could result in 
local failure in the Bay Mud and significant lateral movements. 
These movements are generally are unnoticed during excavation, but 
based on the experience from an adjacent project, could result in 
significant lateral deflections of the foundation piles before they are 
incorporated into the structure. 
ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES AND RESULTS 
Following removal of the existing asphalt parking lot at the site, the 
sheet piles for the shoring system were driven. The driving of the 
sheet piles resulted in densification of the loose sand fills at the site, 
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with corresponding settlement of the adjacent streets of 
approximately 6 to 12 inches, with some initial minor cracking. The 
initial excavation was then made, but was inereased from 6 to 8 feet 
in depth by the contractor for easier installation of the perimeter 
waler. During this initial excavation, the top of existing wood piles 
were encountered that were speculated to be part of an old wharf. 
These piles were determined by the contractor to interfere with the 
installation of the new concrete foundation piles for the building, and 
as a result the owner agreed to their removal. Over 300 piles were 
removed, most within about 60 feet of one side of the shoring. The 
shoring designer requested that the holes resulting from the 
extraction of the wood piles be filled with sand or grout. During 
removal of the wood piles, the contractor found that filling of the 
holes was not practical without expensive equipment and chose to 
forego the backfilling without notifying the shoring designer. 
Throughout this period of time, the geotechnical engineer was not 
aware of any work occurring at the site. 
After the initial excavation was made, the wood piles extracted, and 
the area regraded to allow for access by the pile driving rig, the 
production piles were driven under the observation of the 
geotechnical engineer. Because of the proximity of the site to the 
financial district of San Francisco, all pile driving had to be 
performed at night, which resulted in. "second tier" management by 
the contractor. During pile driving, the amount of penetration into 
the bedrock to achieve adequate support was found to vary 
significantly, even in the same pile cap. Differences of up to about 
10 feet in a 15 by 15 foot pile cap were found. This resulted in a 
large number of piles with the tops above the design pile cut-off 
grade. 
During production pile driving, the portion of the sheet pile shoring 
adjacent to where the wood piles had been removed, was found to 
have moved several inches toward the excavation. These movements 
were larger than anticipated at this stage of construction. It was 
decided to monitor the movements of the shoring system on a weekly 
basis. 
Following production pile driving, excavation began without prior 
review of the operation by the geotechnical engineer, as required by 
the project specifications, and without notification to the geotechnical 
engineer. When approximately one-half of the excavation for the 
central mat was completed, the geotechnical engineer noticed, during 
an unrelated site visit, that near vertical temporary cut slopes of up to 
15 feet in height had been made in the fill and Bay Mud, counter to 
the original recommendations by the engineer. There was a concern 
that lateral movements could have an impact on the piles that 
extended above the design pile cut-off grade. The excavation 
operation was stopped, and procedures were changed to perform the 
excavation more uniformly across the site. During the excavation 
movement of the shoring adjacent to the location where the wood 
piles were pulled continued to occur. At one point, a maximum rate 
of about 1/8 inch in a 24 hour period was measured. These 
movements were additionally impacted by the contractor creating 
steeper than designed inclinations at the toe of the berm slope and 
insufficient dewatering of the interior of the site which result~ in 
constant water infiltration. The insufficient dewatering caused the 
near fluid B~y Mud to flo": !nto th~ e~.c~~ation w.here exposed in the 
berm. This created additiOnal mstab1hty dunng the excavation 
process. 
Beca~s~ of concerns of the impact on the schedule of emergency 
!emed1ation, m~sures to address the movements· were not 
Implemented until after the shoring had moved about 10 inches into ~e .ex~vation. The measures implemented included decreasing the 
mch?ation of th~ berm slope from approximately 1-1/2 to 1 
(honzontal ~ yerucal) to between 3 and 4 to 1. This measure was 
fo.un? to . Slgmficantly slow' the rate of movement, but did not 
ehmmate :t. As a result of using ~is scheme, the lateral extent of 
the berm m~eased and the plan SIZe of the central mat had to be 
reduced, . whtch resulted in longer internal bracing (struts). During 
the remamder of the excavation, the contractor many times ignored 
the concerns of the geotechnical engineer concerning the. precarious 
balance that had been achieved by the remediation scheme and 
elected to make near vertical notches in the earth berm to con'struct 
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tower cranes and to install dewatering sumps, stockpiled mateJ 
and soil at the top of steepen slopes, and excavated in the str 
behind the shoring where dmgonal corner bracing was located, al 
which resulted in additional movements. Ultimately, the maxin 
shoring movement was over 18 inches, which resulted in the los 
usable basement space and distress to adjacent streets and utilities. 
During the excavation process, it was uncertain as to what im 
the movement of the shoring would have on the foundation pil~ 
the building. Following excavation for the central mat, most o1 
piles nearest the location from where the wood piles were extra 
were found to be 4 to 19 inches off design location, wit 
preponderance of mislocations away from the shoring. ' 
mislocation could have been the result of lateral movement of 
shoring or the earth berm during excavation, errors made in 
original pile location layout, piles inadvertently driven off 1~ 
(especially with the use of a long follower, which made vi 
tracking impossible), or a combination of these. It was determ 
that only the lateral movement scenario would have a signifi 
impact on the future performance of the structure, since the 1 
could be either broken or overstressed laterally. As a result, vm 
attempts were made to verify the adequacy of the piles to suppor 
design vertical and lateral loads. The first attempt was based or 
assumption that any pile that had been elastically deflected by 
movement would possess sufficient strain energy to bounce bac 
freed by removal of soil on the tension side. A large diameter a 
was used to remove the soil from the tension side, but due tc 
plastic nature of the Bay Mud at design pile cut-off grade, this 
approach proved inconclusive. Sonic testing of the piles also pr• 
to be inclusive. Finally, two vertical and lateral pile load tests · 
performed, using the adjacent piles for reactions. These tests sh< 
the piles were capable of supporting at least 150 percent oJ 
vertical design load. It was concluded that the piles are capab: 
supporting the design loads as long as the pile caps and assoc 
mat are sufficiently reinforced to evenly distribute the design 1< 
In this way a single pile defect, if any existed, would only ha 
minimal effect on the mat as a whole. 
After completion of the project, legal action was brought b) 
owner against the geotechnical engineer and the shoring designe 
material and delay costs, estimated to be approximately six mi 
dollars. The engineers cross-filed against the contractor. The 
was settled out of court, with the terms not disclosed. 
ISSUES 
In reviewing the construction of the project, the problems 
occurred were found to result from many issues, with no spe< 
issue easily identified as the main source of the problems. TJ 
issues include technical, budgetary, coordination, staffing, 
"hidden agenda" issues not initially understood by some of the de 
consultants. These issues are discussed below. 
A unique characteristic of the project was the partnership that rr 
up its ownership. The development was owned by a lim 
partnership consisting of a developer, the ~eneral contractor for 
project, and one of the a design engineenng company, along , 
numerous minority partners. The make-up of this partnership 
not apparent to the geotechnical engineer at the outset of the proj 
and became known to him only after difficulties arose in which 
contractor was at odds with the geotechnical engineer regarc 
appropriate solutions. In instances where this occurred, 
contractor would, on occasion, invoke his position as an owne 
reject decisions which were unfavorable to him. Because of this 
usual relationship between owner/designer/contractor did not alv 
exist. Decisions affecting the contractor's work were difficul 
discuss with the ownership partners, and criticisms of procedure 
quality of work were sometimes rejected outright. In general, t 
was a perception by the contractor/owner and that he knew besl 
the project regardless of the criticisms or recommendations prese 
by consultants. This attitude contributed to problems with excav~ 
and shoring techniques, and hindered implementation of solutions 
Review by the geotechnical engineer of the shoring system 
performed by a staff engineer relatively inexperienced in this typ 
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excavation. Although the review fulfilled "the intent" of the review, 
a more in-depth review would have revealed that the design 
inclination of the berm slope was probably too steep for the Bay Mud 
conditions at the site, that the depth of shoring below the bottom of 
the excavation was probably not sufficient to avoid heave, and the 
stability of the shoring during the various stages were not sufficient 
to limit movements to the originally anticipated 2 inches. In short, 
the shoring design was not overly conservative and was very 
sensitive to errors in installation and any unanticipated conditions. 
However, since movement be~an at a stage of excavation before the 
above items could have sigruficantly impacted the stability of the 
excavation, it is unknown what influence they would have had on the 
ultimate performance of the shoring if other things had not gone 
awry. 
There was no pre-construction meeting to discuss the soil report or 
procedures for excavation recommended in the report. Essential 
recommendations given by the geotechnical engmeer had been 
omitted from the construction documents either throu~h oversight or 
as cost cutting measures. Specific recommendations regarding 
excavation procedures were omitted. Recommendations for 
backfilling of voids created by the removal of timber piles were 
dispensed with because of costs. During the initial stages of 
construction it was apparent, in hindsight, the trend the contractors 
attitude would take toward the consultants and their 
recommendations. Recommendations were selectively implemented 
and changed, including the depth of initial excavation, which was 
increased, 
Because of deadlines related to financing and tax considerations the 
project was on an accelerated construction schedule. Pressure was 
therefore placed on fast-tracking foundation installation and basement 
excavation. A number of design details associated with these 
activities were overlooked inadvertently because of haste, and others 
were not implemented because they were considered too time 
consuming. Excavations were made in excess of the depths 
prescribed by the sequencing and were not properly braced when old 
foundations were removed below the depth of planned excavation, 
and other activities were carrier out without notifying the responsible 
consultant. Consultants were not informed either through ignorance 
of the contractor, or to avoid their possible objection to the 
procedures being used. As a result, the geotechnical engineer was 
often unaware of activities under his purview until after the fact, and 
sometimes after significant problems had arisen. This is especially 
true in association with the pulling of the existing wood piles, and 
lOt refilling the resultin~ voids. As a result of allowing the Bay Mud 
:o squeeze into the vo1ds created by pulling nearly 300 piles, the 
.ntegrity of the earth berm to restrain the shoring was reduced. 
:nteraction with the geotechnical engineer would have hopefully 
-esulted in another approach that would have filled the voids, such as 
:routing of the voids as the piles were extracted. 
The architect for the project was an out-of-town firm that did not 
naintain an office in the locale of the project to service it. 
:ommunications were initially handled through the contractor's 
uperintendent. As the project pro~ressed, a full-time construction 
1anagement specialist was brought m by the ownership. However, 
is primary function was to control costs. As problems with work 
rogress arose, discussions with the project manager became more 
jversarial and not conducive to solving problems, especially where 
elays and/or additional costs were involved. 
When shorin~ movements became excessive, rather than halt 
'cavation until an adequate solution could be formulated, the 
mtractor and construction manager insisted excavation of the site 
:oceed ~d a solution be found as the work was in progress. This 
:suited m several attempts at arresting the movement which failed 
~~~e of slow impl.ementation, poor design, and changing 
•nd1tions as the excavation progressed. In the end, excavation work 
iC1 to be halted, portions of the site backfilled, and after days of 
•lay, started anew with a drastically changed excavation and shoring 
heme. 
3ecause of the location of the project near the financial district of 
n Francisco, all pile driving had to be performed at night. Other 
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construction activities were carried out during the day. As a result, 
senior personnel of the general contractor were on-site durin~ the day 
and the night shift was usually manned by junior or second tier staff. 
These people were generally Inexperienced with the issues they, were 
called upon to decide during the pile driving. The e<;>~plex1ties of 
the site and the variable nature of the subsurface cond1tions resulted 
in several situations which could not be resolved on the spot by th,e 
contractors night staff. Delays were therefore incurred, usuallY. until 
the next day, while the proper people were contacted and the 1ssues 
resolved. 
Finally, consideration should be given to assessing the difference 
between acceptable movements and failure. Although there .were n:o 
drastic shoring failures during the project, movement of 18 mches 1s 
beyond that acceptable for this t)'l>e of excavation. The process to 
estimate lateral movements of shonng systems are generally based on 
experience, rather than the use of analysis. For this project, the 
original estimate by the shoring designer of two inches of lateral 
movement was probably based on previous projects that most li!'elY 
included excavations other than in Bay Mud sites. The two mch 
movement was probably an underestimate due to the significant 
amount of movement required to develop maximum passive pressure 
in the Bay Mud. A technical approach should be used to estimate the 
lateral movements of the shoring more accurately. In this way, 
problems within the design scheme and parameters used may be 
found before the system is installed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is the intent of the authors in presenting this case history to show 
that unsuccessful results can be caused by issues which are not 
specifically related to the technical aspects of design. The 
geotechnical engineer should be aware of these non-technical issues 
and their possible impact on the performance of the design. In 
addition, when providing technical services, consideration should be 
given to addressing issues other than those specifically requested by 
the client or governmental agencies. The overall success of 
geotechnical aspects of the project may depend upon details not 
directly the responsibility of the geotechmcal engineer. 
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